Flender/Flender Gear Units/Helical speed reduction gearboxes H2
) and Watteeuw ([0% - 1%]). These competitors are capable of neutralisingany foreclosure attempt by Siemens. Also, most of Flenders

downstream rollingstock gear customers satisfy their dema nds by internal production. Whilst rolling stock competitor to Siemens has put forwar

that switching suppliers or turning to in-house production would take time and ould come at significant cost, other gear customers

have not confirmed such switching problems as most of the demand is already dual-sourced and to signifi cant degree standardised.

It appears that these switching costs are generally lower than hypothetical (not taking intoaccount longer term supply agreements) 5% to 1% price increase used as the standard test for hypothetical monopolist. The time needed to switch (6 to 1 months) is generally shorter than the suppl contracts in which Flender is engaged. Also, final customers for rolling stock ha ve no preferences with regard to the supplier of the gears. In addition, the Co mmissions investigation has indicated that the merged entity would have little scope for raising competing rolling stock manufacturers costs, for instance by in creasing the price of Flenders gear products, as these make up for less than 5% of the overall cost of the rolling stock. It can therefore be concluded that th acquisition of Flender will not increase Siemens market power in any downstream market. 3. competitor to Flender has argued that it ould be foreclosed from the market for passenger transport gears as Siemens would source its future needs for passengertransport gears internally from Flender. Such foreclosure from supply-side point of view is unlikely. When assessed on the basis of national markets, Siemens has market shares in excess of 2% in the ma rkets for trams, metros and regional trains in several Member States, which are mo stly between [3% - 4%] and [3% - 4%] (market shares calculated on the basi of orders received in the period 1- . There are three markets